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PANEL IV
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN CRIMINAL LAW
Lois Haight Herrington t
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to our discussion of personal responsibility in crimi-
nal law. My name is Lois Herrington and in a few minutes I will
introduce the panelists. Last year in America, over 34,000,000 peo-
ple were victims of crime.1 Of this number, approximately
6,000,000 were victims of violent crime. 2 Recent statistics show that
for every one hundred violent crimes committed in the United
States, fifty-five incidents are reported to the police; eighteen assail-
ants are apprehended; eleven cases are filed for prosecution; nine
defendants are convicted, six are incarcerated; four go to jail and
two are sent to prison.3
We have only recently focused on what happens if a criminal is
incarcerated. The median time served in jail is four months.4 The
median time served in the state prison system is seventy-nine
months for murder, thirty-eight months for robbery, seventy-one
months for rape, thirty-two months for aggravated assault, and
t Former President's Correspondent to the United Nations Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. A.B. University of California at Da-
vis; J.D. University of California, Hastings School of Law. Assistant Attorney General
1983 to 1986; Chairman of the White House Conference for a Drug Free America 1987.
The author has also served as Chairman of The President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime, as a United States Delegate to four United Nations Conferences, and as Deputy
District Attorney of Alameda County, California. In addition, she has practiced in the
private sector for Herrington & Herrington and is currently a Trustee of the Federalist
Society.
1 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
1990, at 2 (Oct. 1991); BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, VIOLENT
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Mar. 1991).
2 Id.
3 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMPILATION (1991) (on
file with author).
4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 1988, at 1 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter FELONY SENTENCES]. See also BUREAU
OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CENSUS OF LOCALJAILS, 1988, at
1 (Feb. 1990); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE STATITIcs-1990, at 593 (1990) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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twenty-two months for burglary or drug trafficking. 5 This can
hardly be considered draconian by any realistic analysis or defini-
tion. In fact, it is important to note that while the population of the
United States is approximately 250,000,000 people, the total state
and federal prison population is approximately 771,000 people,
which is a little less than one-half of one percent of the total popula-
tion.6 During the 60's and 70's, while serious crime rose almost
400%, prison capacity rose only 27%. 7 We had a moratorium on
prison building during that time, and we are playing catch-up be-
cause of that moratorium.
At this point we will consider the government's role in the in-
teraction between individuals in society and the criminal law. Who
is responsible when a person is raped, robbed, or murdered?
Throughout the history of the common law, the inquiry was focused
on the actor. In twentieth century America, however, some have
suggested that a wider net of responsibility be cast. In placing re-
sponsibility for crime, is it legitimate to consider the responsibility
of the perpetrator's family, the educational system, the neighbor-
hood, the environment, the victim or the system itself? Some say
yes. Others argue that such considerations simply allow the actor to
avoid the responsibility which is his alone. The panel will consider
these competing views this morning.
Any meaningful discussion of personal responsibility in crime
must necessarily examine the entire criminal justice system. Should
the criminal justice system focus on other issues besides the guilt or
innocence of the actor? In the pursuit of other laudable goals, such
as protection of constitutional rights, should physical evidence or
confessions which clearly connect the defendant to the charged
crimes be withheld from the jurors ruling on his guilt or innocence?
For example, the protection provided by the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda,8 become open to
question or analysis. Or are there other remedies which will safe-
guard constitutional guarantees but would not absolve everyone of
responsibility?
5 FELONY SENTENCES, supra note 4, at 3; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 614-15; Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1985, at 3
(Dec. 1990).
6 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990 (May
1990); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS AT MID-YEAR
1990 (Oct. 1990).
7 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, MAKING CONFINEMENT DECISIONS (1987); Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISON-
ERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925-1986 (June 1988).
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, reh "g denied, California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890
(1966).
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One of the major objectives of government should be the safety
and protection of its citizens, either through the military in the time
of war, or through law enforcement in the time of peace. Has there
been, however, an insidious change in our national thinking? Have
we put the burden on the innocent citizen to stay out of harm's way,
rather than requiring, as any civilization must, that people do not
break the law? Some believe we have shifted responsibility for
crime from those who do it to those who suffer it. We do tend to
blame the innocent victims of crime. We have all witnessed it. We
have seen defense attorneys in trial turn to the victim at the height
of cross-examination and ask "Well, what were you doing out on
that street at night, Mrs. Jones?" or "Why did you answer your
doorbell when it rang?" or "Why did you drive on that street with
your car doors unlocked in that part of town?" One victim elo-
quently stated "To blame victims for crime is like analyzing the
cause of World War II and asking, 'What was Pearl Harbor doing in
the middle of the Pacific anyway?' "9 Can it be argued that we have
accepted a siege mentality in which we have no right to feel safe
unless we are behind locked doors?
We have laws to ensure some minimum level of behavior that is
universally recognized as being essential for a civilized society.
Laws reflect the values of our society. And the seriousness with
which we hold these values is measured by the penalty imposed
when these values are violated. Therefore, how do we in the United
States reflect our values for human life and welfare when threatened
by rape and murder, robbery, burglary or drug trafficking? How do
we, as a civilized society, place responsibility for uncivil behavior?
Who should be punished? For what reasons should we punish?
What criteria should we utilize in devising appropriate penalties? Is
rehabilitation still a viable goal, or is it simply "habilitation" now?
What role does deterrence play, and is it feasible with our current
sentencing standards? Should we, as a society, punish for the in-
structional value for the next generation? Some reformers today le-
gitimize incapacitation by stating that as long as criminals are in jail
and prison, they are not victimizing innocent citizens.
I believe that few subjects impact our lives more than personal
responsibility in criminal law. I am pleased to introduce the very
distinguished panel of experts that will address this issue. Professor
Grano, is a distinguished professor of law at Wayne University,
where he has taught since 1975. He received his A.B. and his J.D.
from Temple University, and his LL.M. from the University of Illi-
nois. He has been a reporter for the Michigan Supreme Court's
9 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 2 (Dec. 1982).
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Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure since 1982 and has pub-
lished essays on the Miranda v. Arizona 10 decision and other criminal
law procedures. In 1988, he was Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Department of Justice.
Mr. Adam Walinsky has practiced with the New York firm of
Kronish, Lieb, Weiner and Hellman since 1971. He attended Cor-
nell University and Yale Law School. After graduation, he clerked
for Judge Hincks of the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Mr.
Walinsky worked with Robert Kennedy at the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment and the U.S. Senate from 1963 to 1968. He ran as the Demo-
cratic candidate for New York State Attorney General in 1970. In
1978, he was appointed to the New York State Commission of In-
vestigation and was its Chairman from 1979 to 1981. Since 1982,
Mr. Walinsky has worked to establish the Police Corps, an organiza-
tion which would allow citizens to serve four year terms as law en-
forcement officers in return for college scholarships.
10 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
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ASCERTAINING THE TRUTH
Joseph D. Granot
OnJune 28, 1991, a group of Detroit girls beat and robbed two
suburban women who were attending a fireworks celebration in
downtown Detroit.' A bystander videotaped the attack, removing
any doubt about what had occurred. Two weeks ago, as I was driv-
ing home from work, I was listening on my car radio to a panel dis-
cussion on racial polarization in the Detroit area. Not surprisingly,
the discussion turned to crime and the June 28th incident. I lis-
tened to an academic express a lack of surprise that such an incident
had occurred. The state, she said, had been cutting programs, and
it had failed to provide "alternatives" (her word, not mine) to oc-
cupy the time and interest of the young assailants. The only thing
missing from this all-too-familiar academic critique was the attribu-
tion of blame to Ronald Reagan. Individual responsibility for this
brutal and senseless crime? Not in the world view of this academic.
On February 8, 1990, four Detroit boys and two adult males
(ages 19 and 20) tried at gunpoint to steal the car of a fifty-three
year old suburbanite who was driving home. The youths had
thrown a tree limb across the road to block the path of the car.
When the driver attempted to speed away, sixteen year old Kermit
Haynes, who said the group wanted the car to go to a party, fired his
gun and killed the driver. Haynes confessed and later pleaded
guilty to first degree murder. Under state law, however, fifteen and
sixteen year old offenders must be sentenced as juveniles unless the
prosecutor proves they should be sentenced as adults. 2
In an attempt to have Haynes sentenced as an adult, the prose-
cutor presented the report of a psychologist who described Haynes
as sadistic, amoral, and dangerous. The psychologist said Haynes
showed all the signs of a psychopath, and he offered a poor progno-
sis even with the best efforts of the Department of Social Services.
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University, 1975-present. A.B.,
1965;J.D., 1968 Temple University; LL.M. University of Illinois. The author has been a
reporter for the Michigan Supreme Court's Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure
since 1982 and has published essays on the Miranda v. Arizona decision and other crimi-
nal law procedures. In 1988, he served as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
United States Department ofJustice, Office of Legal Policy.
I See Dave Farrell & Vivian S. Toy, Mayor Blasts Media For Reports on Taped Beatings,
GANNE-r NEws SERV., July 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Girl,
17, Gets 15 Years in Beatings, CHi. TRiB., Aug. 23, 1991, at M3.
2 MIcH. COMp. LAws §§ 769.1(3), 769.1(5), 771.14a (1991).
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Another psychologist said that Haynes showed violent tendencies
and that his actions in the case were intentional and premeditated.
This psychologist found no indication that Haynes could be
rehabilitated.
On August 28, 1991, Dalton Roberson, who is the ChiefJudge
of the Detroit Recorder's Court, declined to sentence Haynes as an
adult, which would have meant life imprisonment without parole.
Criticizing the prosecutor for not presenting an objective account of
Haynes's "rehabilitative potential," Judge Roberson placed Haynes,
the confessed gunman, in the custody of the Department of Social
Services until he turns twenty-one. Individual responsibility for this
senseless taking of human life? Clearly not in the world view of
Judge Roberson.
Are these mere anecdotes? Of course. But to the ordinary citi-
zen, these "anecdotes" frighteningly illustrate a legal system that
has ceased to work, a legal system that too rarely holds individuals
responsible and accountable for the evil they perpetuate. (I use the
word "evil" deliberately; it is a word that we should reintroduce into
our lexicon.) The driver's widow, expressing shock at Judge Rober-
son's action, allegedly asserted that the sentence was a "clear
message that life is cheap." Unfortunately, the street-smart hood-
lums of our society understand this message as well as the hapless
widow.
Many lawyers and judges sanctimoniously defend our criminal
injustice system as essential to individual freedom. Similarly aca-
demics, searching for anything or anyone to blame except the indi-
vidual offenders, often applaud approaches that give offenders
second, third, fourth, and even more chances to commit crimes.
While these people defend the system, law abiding citizens desert
the city's activities, restaurants, and retail merchants.3
What accounts for the persistence of the world view illustrated
by the misguided academic and judge? To a large extent, I believe
it is the attitude of "there but for the grace of God go I," referring
unfortunately to the offender rather than the victim. This attitude
has its roots in the civil rights movement of the 1960s and in the
conventional liberal ideology of the time that equated the typical
criminal defendant in one courtroom with the civil rights plaintiff in
another. Do not misunderstand me. I am not criticizing the civil
rights revolution. Conservatives may have been correct in expres-
sing federalism concerns as a reason for opposing the civil rights
legislation of the 1960s, but the deafening silence of many of yester-
3 See Carolyn Walkup, Detroit Blues Dogging Downtown Operations, NATION'S RESTATE-
MENT NEWS, Jan. 13, 1992 (NExis, OMNI) (Business has dropped more than 50% in
downtown Detroit since the June 28th incident and a recent rash of carjackings.).
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day's conservatives about the profoundly immoral system of Jim
Crow, and their concomitant failure to search meaningfully for al-
ternative remedies to Big Brother, account in part for the albatross
that contemporary conservatism still carries around its neck. This
failure is in large part responsible for liberal suspicion of conserva-
tism's legitimate objections to racial preference policies on behalf of
minorities and to the liberal ideology that permeates the criminal
justice system. My argument is not with the civil rights revolution of
the 1960s but rather with the distorted vision that saw, and still sees,
the criminal offender not as the responsible perpetrator of an evil
deed but as an unfortunate victim of a racist and oppressive society.
The view that the blame for crime lies with society rather than
with the individual offender did not have much popular appeal even
in the 1960s, and it has even less appeal today as crime runs ram-
pant in our cities. Moreover, the "no responsibility" social deter-
minists always have had to confront the rather insurmountable
obstacle that the substantive criminal law is premised on a founda-
tion of individual free will and responsibility. The common law re-
quirement of mens rea aptly illustrates this free will foundation.
Arguments certainly have been made in support of new determinis-
tic defenses-drug addiction, brainwashing, battered wife syn-
drome, post-traumatic stress, and just plain rotten social
background. The fact remains, however, that the substantive crimi-
nal law has always presumed that concepts of individual responsibil-
ity and blame are valid.
The procedural system, however, offered an attractive end run
for those determined to undermine the substantive law's commit-
ment to individual responsibility. The primary target was the basic
notion that the paramount goal (I didn't say the only goal) of sound
procedure should be the ascertainment of truth. Individual respon-
sibility and accountability are not easy to achieve in a system that
denigrates the importance of discovering the truth. The academics
provided the underlying theory; the academics, lawyers, and judges
together provided an abundance of truth-defeating procedural
rules.
I am not going to review or critique the numerous truth-
defeating procedural rules that plague our system. Most of us are
familiar with the search and seizure exclusionary rule, with Miranda4
and Massiah,5 with the rule against prosecutorial comment on a de-
fendant's silence,6 and with the effort to adopt the minority rule on
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
6 E.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1985) (such comment violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.).
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entrapment, 7 which would make the defendant's guilt or innocence
irrelevant. We also are familiar with liberalism's continuing, and
largely successful, effort to retain these truth-defeating rules. The
latest example being the organized drive, spearheaded by the often-
wrong ABA, to defeat the Bush Administration's badly needed re-
forms in the area of habeas corpus.
To facilitate the denigration of the search for truth, the academ-
ics who advocated these rules attacked the very concept of truth.
We were told, for example, that any emphasis on "truth" must be
simplistic, given the "plural forms and multifaceted aspects of that
beguiling concept." (I often have wondered what my mother's re-
action would have been had I responded to a question about
whether I locked my sister in the basement by saying, "Well, the
truth is multifaceted and beguiling.") This argument against truth
has followed two different tracks. The first maintains that factfind-
ing is an uncertain process because of its dependency upon the per-
ceptions, inferences, memory, and veracity of fallible human
witnesses.9 In Professor Goodpaster's words, the relationship be-
tween judicial truth and " 'real truth,' whatever that might be, is inde-
terminable."' 0 The second argument, hinted at in Goodpaster's
remark, more broadly maintains that the concept of truth itself has
little meaning in legal proceedings. In its most modest form, this
argument contends that factual guilt and legal guilt are different
concepts because the latter requires an evaluation of intent and
moral blameworthiness. 1
I will not spend time discussing the legal system's ability to dis-
cover truth, other than to note that most commentators who deni-
grate the discovery of truth seem to have no trouble ascertaining
when the police have violated the judicially created rules that ob-
struct law enforcement efforts. (Nor, might I add, do they have
trouble with the concept of individual responsibility for law enforce-
7 For an example of the minority view on entrapment, see United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
8 H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, andJudicial Hackles: A Reaction Tojudge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (1975).
9 Id., at 1079; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37
MERCER L. REV. 647, 654 (1986).
10 Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 118, 133 (1987) (emphasis added).
I1 See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 476-77 (1980) (but
including questions pertaining to the defendant's intent as relevant to the inquiry into
factual guilt); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. LJ. 185, 197-98 (1983) (this time including
questions of intent as relevant to the moral evaluation of the defendant's conduct);
Goodpaster, supra note 10, at 130-33 (denying that fact and law can be radically sepa-
rated); Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 654; Uviller, supra note 8, at 1076.
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ment officers.) I want to focus on the frontal attack on truth as a
concept, an attack led by people such as Professor Stephen
Saltzburg. Professor Saltzburg has asserted that "an estimate of the
results attained through evaluations of the facts in light of gov-
erning substantive principles will be neither true nor false." 12
Professor H. Richard Uviller has offered this example to illus-
trate both that factual and legal guilt are conceptually different and
that "truth" is not an appropriate concept to apply to verdicts in
many criminal cases:
Did the victim, moments before the defendant shot him, point a
six-inch blade at the defendant and say, "I'll kill you," or did he
show a two-inch knife and say, "Don't come a step closer"? That
is a simple issue of factual truth, and it is quite different from the
question: did the defendant act in self-defense?"3
True enough, a homicide is justified by self-defense only when
the perpetrator reasonably believes that killing is necessary to pro-
tect himself from imminent death or serious bodily injury. More-
over, evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's fear cannot
be equated with ascertaining who brandished what weapon or said
what to whom. Nevertheless, I would submit that a normative judg-
ment appropriately can be deemed "incorrect" when it rests on an
incorrect factual assessment.
I should first say as an aside that the majority of criminal ver-
dicts probably do not require such normative judgments but rather
turn on factual issues. However, even in cases involving a normative
judgment, such as some cases of self-defense, a verdict still can be
described as correct or incorrect. Whether it is correct or incorrect
will depend upon the accuracy of the underlying factual
determinations.
Assume that ajury in Uviller's example makes its normative de-
cision before deciding on the facts and concludes that it will acquit
the defendant on the first version of the facts but convict on the
second. Since reasonable people may disagree over the definition
of reasonable, the jury's normative judgment, if within the bounds
of reasonable disagreement, defines the correct and just verdict for
each hypothetical version of the facts. The jury's actual verdict,
however, can be "correct" only if the jury accurately ascertains the
actual facts. Thus, if the jury mistakenly decides that the first factual
version is true, it will render an erroneous and unjust acquittal; if it
mistakenly decides that the second version is true, it will render an
erroneous and unjust conviction.
12 Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 654.
13 Uviller, supra note 8, at 1076.
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In the example, the jury's normative judgment is not subject to
assessment in terms of its truth, but factual truth is a necessary con-
dition of a correct and just normativejudgment. My point holds true
even if jury nullification is factored into the analysis. Suppose, for
example, that a jury is willing to nullify a draft card burning law as
applied to a conscientious objector but not as applied to someone
simply trying to evade the draft. If such a jury, perhaps because a
trustworthy confession is excluded from evidence, unwittingly ac-
quits a defendant who is not a conscientious objector, its act of nulli-
fication will be neither correct nor just.
To conclude, our criminal justice system-indeed, our whole
society--desperately needs to rediscover the importance of individ-
ual responsibility for evil acts. One important and necessary step to
this goal, I submit, would be the clear repudiation of arguments that
deny either the existence or importance of objective truth in the ad-
ministration of criminaljustice. This would be important for its own
sake, but I think it also would help in reducing the crime rate. This
latter point, however, is an argument for another day.
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INDIVIDUAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CRIMINAL LAW
Adam Walinskyt
Think of the numbers that our moderator gave us; and then
understand that 47% of violent crime is reported. Also consider
clearance rates, which have been going down very sharply. For ex-
ample, the clearance rate on homicide was never, in the past, lower
than 90%: it is now down to 67% nationally.' The clearance rate
on robbery, which is the archetypal street crime, is now 25% nation-
ally.2 Only half of all robberies are reported. And of those re-
ported, 25% are being cleared by an arrest.3 A reasonable number
of convictions result from those arrests, but 98% of the convictions
will be by plea.4 Therefore, the whole elaborate superstructure of
trials, decisions, and appellate opinions actually only address about
one-quarter of one percent of what is really happening in the world.
While much of the discussion here perhaps does no active damage,
it likely does very little good. We would do better to focus on the
larger phenomenon.
Discussion of individual responsibility in the criminal law ought
to start with an understanding that "criminal law" is a misleading
phrase. The criminal law is, in reality, the fundamental social code:
you may .not hit your neighbor over the head and take his goods.
We must accept that this is an individual responsibility to do more
than refrain from malign action. Criminal law also goes beyond the
question, "What is the moral responsibility of someone else to re-
frain from crime?" The real question, particularly in a room like
this, is "What is our individual responsibility to come to the aid of
t Kronish, Lieb, Weiner and Hellman, 1971-Present. B.A. Cornell University; J.D.
Yale Law School. Law clerk for Judge Hincks, Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.
Appointed in 1978 and chairman from 1979-81 of the New York State Commission of
Investigation. The author worked with Robert Kennedy at the U.S. Justice Department
and the U.S. Senate from 1963 to 1968. He also ran as the Democratic candidate for
New York State Attorney General in 1970. Since 1982, the author has worked to estab-
lish the Police Corps, an organization which would allow citizens to serve four year
terms as law enforcement officers in return for college scholarships.
1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS 1990, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (1990).
2 Id.
4 John D. Woolright, The Impact of Jurisdiction Size on Guilty Plea Rates in 569 State
Courts, 74 Soc. & SOCIAL RES. 40 (1989) (finds great variance in guilty plea rate between
60% and almost 100%).
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others?" Otherwise, we are just here to agree that we are each iso-
lated and alone, with no community or commonwealth. The profes-
sional lives of lawyers may be built on the proposition that we
should advance the interests of a single client at the expense of the
entire world: let justice, as we call it, rule until the heavens fall.
Nevertheless, even lawyers have to understand that bringing down
the heavens is not really our mission in life.
One focus must be the conditions of the underclass because this
is the breeding ground for the violence that has spread like a stain
across every part of this country. Ten years ago, Saul Bellow told us
that:
children born outside the law and abandoned by their parents can
be eaten by dogs. Eaten by dogs or brought up without humanity.
Nobody teaching the young language, human usages or religion,
they will go back to the great ancient forests and be like the wild
beasts of Orpheus. None of the great compacts of the human race
respected. Bestial venery, feral wanderings, incest and the dead
left unburied.... Except, of course, that there are no longer any
great forests to go back to.5
This description is not mere poetry. It is a description of life in
which children are growing. We are conservatives. If there is any-
thing for which the conservative tradition stands, it is that the most
important human responsibility is to teach the young. By teaching
children, we establish the fundamental conservative proposition that
there is a past which is important and that there will be a future for
which we have a responsibility. Otherwise, we are mere animals lost
in the desert of present time.
We must question what we are going to do individually, what
responsibility will we take for our fellow citizens, for children who
otherwise will grow without the capacity for moral judgment? We
can visit upon them as many pains and penalties as we wish; we can
kill them in large numbers; we can imprison them in greater num-
bers, but we are raising more and more of these monsters every
year.
Is there evil? Of course. But we ought to ask ourselves: "Why
is it that in our country we have so much more evil today than we
did twenty, forty or fifty years ago?" If educated people do not ask
this question, then no one will, and we will not answer it.
There are several ways in which we can take the individual re-
sponsibility to act in the truly conservative sense: the observation of
the fundamental moral code. One is as participants in government.
As participants in the process of government, in the exercise of
5 SAUL BELLOW, THE DEAN'S DECEMBER 251 (1982).
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power, you can use your position and your access to call the govern-
ment to its fundamental responsibility. I think it is foolish, even
laughable, to blame President Reagan for everything that is wrong
in the country. It would, however, be a grave error not to recognize
that our government has been truly irresponsible in allowing the
continuation of these conditions and in failing to extend the funda-
mental protections of law and the Constitution to all of the people
of the United States. One thing you all can do is not let people
forget their responsibilities by making yourselves nuisances or
burrs. Force attention to these issues.
Second, we can attempt to create institutions and mechanisms
to enable citizens to participate in the establishment and the protec-
tion of the law. Some of us have been working to establish a Police
Corps. In this Corps, citizens would fulfill a civic duty and serve as
police officers on an ROTC principle; to accept, as part of the price
of their education, the obligation to share directly in the enforce-
ment of the law and the extension of safety, security, and decency to
people trying to raise their children. 6 In this effort, the dedication
of one of your founders, Peter Keisler, has been essential.
Third, for those who think that the government is too much
with us, there is always room for individual action. The perfect
model for individual responsibility in the criminal law are the
Guardian Angels; perhaps Curtis Sliwa should be standing here.
Some of you may think this example is overdrawn; you are, after all,
lawyers. You may be thinking "Where does he get off talking about
that kind of physical danger, much less the obligation to devote
enormous efforts to the change of these conditions?" In response, I
want to remind you what some of our responsibilities might be.
Your generation is uniquely favored in the history of this coun-
try. You are almost alone in this century in that you have been not
called upon to fight in some foreign war. You are the first to benefit
from the collapse of the communist empire-something for which
Americans over the past forty years have been working, sacrificing,
and even dying for. You are the inheritors of an unbelievable
wealth of material richness and technology. It is now your turn to
join in the sacrifice and effort. I have heard it said, "How does this
come to be my responsibility?" People believe the responsibility for
poor children belongs to their parents. Consider that the leading
cause of death in this country for black children between the ages of
one and four is fire. The leading cause of death is kids just burning
up because somebody did not attend to them. How is that yours to
change? The only rejoinder I have is to suggest that you go to Ar-
6 See 137 CONG. REC. H8153-58 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep.
McGurdy).
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lington National Cemetry and look at all of the crosses. The men
and women buried there did not ask to die in battle. They simply
did their duty when called to serve.
On a personal note, I was privileged to be around when this
society was created; I know the impulses toward scholarship and
public service from which the society was born. I urge you now not
to be caught in the easy simplicities of the kinds of discussions that
you had in law school. The time for those nice ideological fights is
over. The question we must address is how to save our country
when the very structure of law and the whole moral basis for its exis-
tence is rapidly failing. I know enough of you to be confident that
you will play your proper part in this effort over the years to come.
DISCUSSIONt
HERRINGTON:
Thank you very much. I have a few comments for the panelists.
Professor Grano, should we abolish rules and then create a right
without remedy? I hope you will discuss that a little bit, in your
rebuttal. We accept a premise that we have more people in prison
in the United States than in any other country in the world. I am
telling you that we do not know if this premise is true. We have the
most honest, open-to-scrutiny statistics of any country in the world.
Many other countries skew their statistics in such a way that we do
not know the truth. Instead of prisons, some other countries have
instant capital punishment and maiming. They do not have prisons.
Some countries have mental institutions where people go for life.
They do not call these institutions prisons but inmates are never
released. Other countries do not consider certain actions to be
crimes. For instance, child molestation, family violence, child abuse
are not crimes in many other countries. I was just reminded of an
opportunity I had to meet with the Minister ofJustice of China. He
told me with great pride that they do not have any career criminals,
they do not have any recidivists. I thought, well that is really some-
thing. How is that possible? Of course, it was due to some bureau-
cratic system. So, when I was walking out, I asked the interpreter to
account for the lack of career criminals. He told me there are forty
crimes subject to capital punishment. The United States would not
have any career criminals either if we did that. Thus, we have to
look very carefilly at every premise. Also if we have more crime
than some countries, we may correspondingly have more criminals
held accountable. Professor Walinsky, in 1982, approximately 42%
of victims reported crime.' We are now treating our victims of
crime better. Since they now feel they can come forward and report,
approximately 48%o of the victims report crime. 2
GRANO:
Well, I found it curious that Professor Morris, who says he be-
lieves in individual responsibility, would, if given a choice to focus
t Professor Norval Morris participated in Panel IV. His remarks, however, do not
appear in this publication.
1 This figure reflects reported crime without burglary. However, the percentage is
higher-55%o-for violent crimes with burglary. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BUL-
LETIN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1990, at 5 (Oct. 1991).
2 Id. See also BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIC-
TIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-88 TRENDS (July 1991).
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on either individual responsibility or on societal responsibility,
choose the latter. What message does he send, and what message
does the legal system send when it makes the same choice? In fact,
it was quite interesting to hear the words that Professor Morris
used. He talked about conditions that generate crime, conditions
that produce crime. Well, "generate" and "produce" are causal
words. I object to using those words. Concededly there is some
correlation. We all know, as he said, where the high crime areas are.
They are usually in the low income areas, the areas of our cities that
are really deplorable. But that does not mean that these conditions
cause crime.
Professor Morris also argued that crime will remain stable, no
matter what we do. This argument assumes that the criminal justice
system is irrelevant to the crime problem, an assumption we have
been operating on since the 1960s. Interestingly, we were also told
just a minute ago that crime has increased in the last twenty and
thirty years. The fact is, it has. When I was a kid, the bad neighbor-
hoods of the city were not as bad as they are today. Why have they
gotten worse? Can it be partly because of the attitude reflected in
these comments, in which we blame the conditions of society rather
than the individuals?
Academics always say, "don't go for simplistic solutions." It is
always more complex, more complicated than that. All of my grand-
parents were immigrants and they had "simplistic" approaches to
life. I think things worked better in those days. In fact, I have often
been tempted to write a book (and when I stop writing law review
articles maybe I will do it). The book would be Raising Children The
Immigrant Way, without the child psychologists and related things. I
think my grandparents did a pretty good job because they just used
common sense. My father told me a story when I was a teenager
and we were having trouble with one of our neighbors. We used to
play half ball in the street. Half ball is a game where you cut a rub-
ber ball in half and use a broomstick to hit it. We did not play in
playgrounds or anything like that, but in the street. One of the
neighbors complained. My father sided with the neighbor because
we had been rude to her. I objected that he always sided with the
neighbors and never with us. He told me a childhood story of a
policeman grabbing him by the ear. His mother came out and asked
what the problem was. Before the policeman could speak, my father
immediately chimed in "Well, this wise guy .... " He never got any
further, because my grandmother rebuked him for speaking that
way about a police officer. The point is that there used to be rules,
things that were wrong, things you did not do. I am not saying that
authority figures are always right. But there were ways of proper
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behavior, ways that were understood. You had no excuses for vio-
lating the rules. And these were people who grew up in the
depression.
It seems to me that what Alan Keyes eloquently said in his re-
marks was not really so profound.3 It was moving and stirring be-
cause it is so foreign to contemporary ears, but it was not really
profound. In fact, my grandparents could have said what Alan
Keyes said. The question is, why is it that the academics cannot see
it?
WALNSKY:
I believe we have many more people in prison than that. Visit
the average housing project, whether in Chicago, New York or many
others around the country: most of the decent people in those
projects are themselves prisoners. We are all, in a sense, restricted
in our liberty by the violence, the crime, the poison of these condi-
tions. What disturbs me about Professor Grano's statement is the
implicit notion in it that if we strike the proper attitudes, applaud at
the right time and say the right things in law schools, this somehow
will make things all right.
Indeed I do not understand why he used the words low income,
which is really our current synonym for black. We do not want to
say "black" because we are so filled with shame, guilt, and fear. We
are so appalled by the horror of our racial division and what it has
brought that we want to speak of it with euphemism rather than con-
front it directly. In comparing our present case to twenty, thirty, or
fifty years ago and asking why there now is so much more evil, our
unwillingness to confront this issue of race is surely a factor. For
thirty years the country of which we are all citizens has basically
withdrawn the authority of government from the ghettos.
The discussion of whether to hold people responsible is in
some ways entirely academic, because the government hardly exists
in large parts of the United States. It is only an accident when one
of these repeated crimes gets dealt with in any serious way. If we
are to change that, if we are to begin to re-establish order, decency,
law, the very simple fundamentals of law enforcement and civilized
conduct, it will require an enormous effort. It will require a great
commitment on the part of each of us, that is much more than sim-
ply thinking the right thoughts. It is going to take work.
QUESTION:
I am struck by the fact that this discussion of individual respon-
sibility and the criminal law has not raised the issue of the war on
drugs and its implications for crime in America today. Professor
3 See Alan Keyes, The Preservation of Liberty, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 969 (1992).
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Morris raised the issue of the propensities, the social conditions that
contribute to-not cause-but contribute to crime. It strikes me
that one of those social conditions is the war on drugs and the per-
verse incentives that have been created by that war. The war on
drugs is really about money in the end, it is not about drugs. The
money and the incentives that surround drugs has driven our crime
rate sky high, has clogged our courts beyond description, and has
overcrowded our prisons such that real criminals are now back out
on the streets much sooner than they should be.
HERRINGTON:
You can certainly say we never focus seriously. Approximately
three cents of each dollar allotted is spent on criminal justice; the
rest is spent on other priorities in the United States. 4
WALINSKY:
I think that the drug sweeps and the large scale drug enforce-
ment attempts have been very destructive and disorganizing ele-
ments. Basically, our police have been acting as the army did in
Vietnam-conducting search and destroy missions but never staying
to guard the hamlets. That is one of the things that has to change.
Regarding the debate about drugs in the country, I think Pro-
fessor Morris is right; everyone is evading the real issue. I think for
many blacks the drug debate is the latest incarnation of the white
devil theory: Ronald Reagan is to blame for our condition because
he lets these evil people bring drugs into our nation's cities. For
many conservatives, drugs were a way of avoiding any serious effort
to cope with the social conditions. We could just send an aircraft
carrier or some Green Berets off to Columbia as our national pro-
gram for dealing with the chaos of the inner city. I do not know that
legalization, which I understand to be the point of your comment,
would make anything much better. If you are asking has all of the
talk and attention on the drug menace really been an enormous dis-
traction from reality, I think the answer is yes.
HERRINGTON:
I just want to comment briefly on one aspect of the last ques-
tion regarding society's values towards drug traffickers. In 1986, the
most recent statistics available, approximately one-third of the con-
victed drug traffickers received straight probation. 5 About one-third
of the drug traffickers were sent to jail, and approximately a little
4 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND
EMPLOYMENT, 1988 (July 1990).
5 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, FELONY DRUGS TRAFFICK-
ING IN STATE COURTS, 1986 (1990).
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over a third were sent to prison.6 And we know about the length of
the sentences.
QUEsnON:
I have often read that one of the reasons we have such a high
percentage of our people in prison is because we have such long
prison sentences. Sociologists, however, believe that the swiftness
and certainty of conviction and imprisonment are more significant
deterrents than the length of the sentence. However, our system
includes things such as the federal sentencing guidelines and life
sentence without parole. Aside from legislating away the exclusion-
ary rule, which I do not favor, I would like the panelists to comment
on effective deterrents and how our system could effectively imple-
ment change.
WALMNSKY:
We have doubled the prison population in the United States
over the last ten years, mostly by lengthening sentences rather than
by imprisoning larger numbers of people.7 Prisons are helpful to
the extent that we are warehousing people who otherwise would be
out committing more crimes. Imprisoning more people does not
seem to act as any kind of deterrent. Unfortunately, we now have a
very large subculture in which going to prison is not feared; it is a
perfectly reasonable and expected part of a young man's life. The
time spent in prison, whether it is three, four, or five years is passed
relatively easily. In prison, there are clean cells, which may indeed
be cleaner than an inmate's home. There are regular meals. As
chairman of the New York State Commission of Investigation, I can
assure you that prisoners get regular exercise, regular sex, and reg-
ular access to drugs. Drugs are as easily obtainable in prison, or
more so, than they are on the street. Use of the prison system as
some grand deterrent measure, as far as the underclass is con-
cerned, is a delusion.
GRANO:
I think the statistics we heard regarding sentencing for crimes
indicate that our sentences are not too long. American sentences
are effectively shorter because you must commit about five crimes
before you get sentenced to prison. So if the sentence for one crime
is actually for six crimes, each sentence is not that long at all.
Second, I would like to comment on the deterrent purpose. Re-
call the story I told you earlier about the young boys and the two so-
6 Id.
7 Clemens Bartollas, The Prison: Disorder Personified, in ARE PRISONS ANY BETrER?
TwENTY YEARS OF CORRECTIONAL REFORM 17-18 (John W. Murphy &Jack E. Dison eds.,
1990) (150% increase in prison population between 1974 and 1987).
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called adults, the nineteen and twenty year olds who shot a driver to
death. It is no accident, no coincidence that the shooting was done
by the juvenile rather than the adult. Ask prosecutors in Detroit,
and I think this would also be true in other cities, and they will tell
you that the shooter is always the young boy. The older boys are
not afraid of prison? They want to go to prison? If so, why do they
have the juvenile commit the murder? Because the juvenile is not
going to go to prison for any length of time. They know it. The law
affects behavior. This claim that the system does not have a deter-
rent effect is a myth that has been perpetuated for thirty years. Our
present system may not have a deterrent effect, but we can reform it
so that it does.
HERRwNGTON:
Be very cautious that you look not at the length of sentences
but rather the time actually served. Also, we do have some strong
indications that the increase in prison population is a result of new
people going to prison, not longer sentences; that is well docu-
mented. The newest Uniform Crime Report's figures show a direct
correlation between the prison population and the reduction in
crime.8 It is absolutely in synch. We cannot forget that.
QUESTION:
I was a narcotics prosecutor in New York for four years. I have
been a defense attorney in Florida for fourteen years. First of all, if
one looks at the criminal dockets in almost all of the cities in the
United States, you will see that almost three-quarters of the crimes
are alcohol or drug related. Most misdemeanors are driving under
the influence of alcohol. Most felonies are drug related crimes such
as possession of cocaine, burglaries, or strong arm robberies. Many
of my clients, as parents, have come to me seeking help to get their
kids into drug rehabilitation programs; only to be turned away be-
cause it costs about $3,000 a month and most insurance policies will
not cover the cost. We have forfeiture laws through which the fed-
eral government currently obtains hundreds of millions of dollars
each year from property rightly forfeited by convicted criminals. 9
Could we pass a law allocating 50% of the money raised by the for-
feiture statutes to a program of commitment on demand by parents.
A parent would then be able to get their kid into a drug rehabilita-
tion program and, therefore, we would perhaps reduce the rising
drug population which is clogging our dockets and costing us
money.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS, 1990, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 11, 1991).
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982 (1988).
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QUESTION:
I was struck by Professor Morris's reference to social disloca-
tion in the inner city causing crime. It seems as if the major social
dislocation in the inner city is crime and the government's inability
to deliver. The most fundamental basis of the social contract, the
prerequisites of civilization.
WAULNSKY:
I do not disagree with you in the slightest. I quote to you Con-
gressmanJohn Lewis, who recently said that "It is not only poverty
that has caused crime.., it is crime that has caused poverty."' 0 It is
precisely for this reason that we must recognize that we have not
enforced the law. We have not extended its protections. We have
allowed violence to run absolutely unchecked through these com-
munities for thirty years. We are now reaping the results of that
failure. Your statement about violence and crime as a generating
cause is absolutely correct. My only question is, now what are we
going to do about it?
10 John Lewis, United States Congressman, Statement by Congressman John Lewis (July
12, 1989) (on file with The Cornell Law Review).
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